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1. INTRODUCTION
Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle 
for the design and operation of nuclear power plants. It is 
the basis for risk-informed decisions by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) [1–3]. In its bare essence, 
defense-in-depth consists in the design and implementa-
tion of multiple safety barriers, technical, procedural, and 
organizational, and whose objective is first to prevent ac-
cident initiating events from occurring, second to block 
accident sequences from escalating, and third to mitigate 
adverse consequences should the previous barriers fail. 
Accidents typically result from the absence, inadequacy, 
or breach of such defenses [4,5]. The purpose of defense-
in-depth is to compensate for uncertainties, inadequacies, 
or incompleteness in risk analysis, and ultimately “to 
protect the plant, the plant operators, and the health and 
safety of the public” from adverse events [6]. Safety 
within the context of defense-in-depth should not be con-
tingent on a single defensive element, hence the “depth” 
qualifier. Although there is yet no official definition of 
defense-in-depth by the NRC, whenever the term is used 
and a definition needed, one is created that is consistent 
with the intended use of the term [1]. There is however a 
general agreement on the need for defense-in-depth, its 
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objectives, the approach to achieve its goals, and the cri-
teria to guide its implementation. A careful review of the 
different perspectives and uses of the term defense-in-
depth is available in [6]. For our present purposes, the 
nuances in the different definitions of defense-in-depth 
are not relevant, and the (functional) definition provided 
above is sufficient for the discussion that follows, namely 
that defense-in-depth is defined by and embodied in the 
design of, and provisions for, diverse and multiple safety 
barriers, technical, procedural, and organizational, and whose 
objectives are the prevention of accident initiating events, 
the blocking of accident sequences, and the mitigation or 
containment of accident consequences2. It is worth clarifying 
that defense-in-depth can be implemented in many ways 
and it requires significant ingenuity—technical, operational, 
organizational, and regulatory—to conceive and implement 
in a variety of contexts and for dealing with different types 
of hazards and uncertainties. An attempt at formalizing 
defense-in-depth and quantifying its effects can be found 
in [7].
Despite its general appeal, defense-in-depth is not 
without its drawbacks [8,9]. For example, its successive 
lines of defense can (inadvertently) enhance mechanisms 
that conceal the transition of a system to an increasingly 
hazardous state, making “systems more […] opaque to 
the people who manage and operate them” [8]. As a result, 
system operators may be left blind to the possibility that 
hazard escalation is occurring, thus decreasing their situ-
ational awareness and shortening the time they have to 
intervene before an accident is released. In other words, 
defense-in-depth may create safety blind spots and de-
crease situational awareness, which in turn translate into a 
shrinking of the time window available for operators and 
decision-makers to identify an unfolding hazardous con-
dition or situation and intervene to abate it. Several acci-
dent reports identified hidden failures and unobservable 
accidents pathogens as important contributing factors to 
the accidents, the Three Mile Island and the Texas City 
refinery accidents are such representative cases [10,11]. 
The NRC database for event reports contains about 90 
cases of unmonitored release paths for contaminated air 
and more than 1400 cases of loss of containment3. This 
will be further examined in Section 3.
How can defense-in-depth enhance mechanisms that 
conceal the transition of a system to an increasingly ha-
zardous state, and thus create safety blind spots? There 
are several pathways by which this can occur; we briefly 
note herein two intuitive modes of occurrence, a physical 
and a functional one:
●  The physical pathway: the physical subset of safety 
barriers in defense-in-depth are placed between 
the energy source(s) and that which needs to be 
protected, to avoid uncontrolled release of energy, 
i.e., an accident, and to prevent harmful interac-
tion between the energy source and that which is 
not meant to be a sink for said energy. This view is 
known as the energy model of accidents, and it has 
led to the development of several safety strategies 
(details can be found in [7]). The physical separa-
tion between energy source and individuals or re-
sources to be protected can create obstacles to the 
observation and monitoring of the situation behind 
the (physical) safety barriers on the one hand, and 
it can obfuscate the status or condition of barriers 
on the other hand. For example, in underground 
coalmines, after a particular section is mined and 
abandoned (while the rest of the mine remains ac-
tive), the section is sealed, and recommendations 
are provided for the design and strength of this 
safety barrier, i.e., the seal. If no additional pre-
cautions are taken, the barrier will obfuscate the 
conditions in the sealed area, and since ventilation 
is no longer available in that section, methane can 
accumulate and reach dangerous explosive levels4. 
In other words, the seal can create a safety blind spot 
and leave the miners unaware than an explosive 
mixture has built up behind the safety barrier. An igni-
tion source would be the last remaining element to 
transform this condition into an accident. The Sago 
mine disaster in West Virginia (January 2006) in 
which 12 miners were killed was the result of such 
a situation [13]. 
●  The functional pathway: defense-in-depth is intrinsi-
cally devised to slow down, minimize, or eliminate 
the effects of local faults or failure events on the 
overall safety and output of the system. Equivalently 
this means that defense-in-depth is meant among 
other things to decrease the sensitivity of the system 
output to local faults or failures and not carry, or 
highly attenuate, their “signature”. This constitutes 
a degraded observability into the states of the system, 
and unless specifically addressed, it can conceal the 
transition of a system to an increasingly hazardous 
state and thus create safety blind spots.
Other or related pathways can also turn into hazard 
concealment mechanisms, for example when the state of 
2   The understanding of defense-in-depth should not be restricted to 
the physical barriers, e.g., fuel cladding and containment building.
3  The search, executed on the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database, 
for “unmonitored AND release AND path” returned 89 results, 
while “loss AND containment” returned 1477 results (keywords in 
the titles and abstracts of the reports). The database is available at 
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx, and was queried 
on 12/09/2013.
4  Methane reaches an explosive range when its concentration in the 
atmosphere reaches between 5% and 15% [12].
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discreet dynamics and evolve by jerks (when updated); 
as such they are more useful and likely to reflect the ac-
tual risk status of a plant than static PSA. Risk monitors 
provide a more continuous monitoring of certain risks in 
a plant, and instead of the new aggregated averages that 
LPSA provide, risk monitors are meant to provide “point-
in-time risk for each plant configuration, … [given] the 
current plant alignments, component outages, and activities 
being carried out that affect the risk and factors related 
to the plant operational state” [15]. Risk monitors are 
typically provided as software packages to nuclear power 
plants, and they are used among other things to schedule 
maintenance “to avoid peaks in risks [and] achieve greater 
flexibility in plant operation” [15]. Observability-in-
depth introduces an online (real-time) mind-set into risk 
analysis and management, and it provides a broad strategic 
heading under which other tools and concepts such as 
LPSA, risk monitors, and prognostic and health management 
can be subsumed. Observability-in-depth supports the 
development of an online probabilistic safety assessment 
(not just a “living” one, as discussed previously), and this 
in turn can help dynamically re-order risk priorities based on 
emerging hazards, and re-allocate some defensive resources 
accordingly.
The objective of this work is to introduce the nuclear 
industry community to the observability-in-depth safety 
principle, and to make the case that it ought to be consi-
dered an important complement to the defense-in-depth 
safety strategy. We illustrate some of the adverse conse-
quences when this principle is violated or not implemented 
using several recent “event reports” from the NRC database. 
By the same token, we identify the set of problems that fall 
within the scope of observability-in-depth and which this 
principle can help address or prevent. We also revisit the 
Three Mile Island accident and identify consequences of 
the lack of observability related to this accident sequence, 
and the failure to prevent it from unfolding in a timely 
manner. 
This work constitutes a first step in the development of 
the observability-in-depth safety principle, and we hope this 
effort invites other researchers and safety professionals 
to further explore and develop this principle. The remainder 
of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
the observability-in-depth safety principle and the many 
ways it can be implemented. Section 3 examines the role 
of observability-in-depth in the nuclear industry through 
detailed analyses of cases selected from the NRC database 
as well as the Three Mile Island accident. Section 4 concludes 
this work. 
2.  SAFETY DIAGNOSABILITY AND OBSERVABILI-
TY-IN-DEPTH 
Observability is a Control Theoretic concept, which 
roughly indicates how well the internal states of a system 
the barrier itself is not monitored and no features are put 
in place to assess its condition, as in the case of the Davis 
Besse, which will be discussed in the next section. 
To prevent this hazard-concealing potential of defense-
in-depth from materializing, we propose in this work a 
safety principle termed “observability-in-depth”. We provide 
the following preliminary definition of observability-in-
depth as:
1.  the set of provisions, technical, operational, and or-
ganizational designed to enable the monitoring and 
identification of emerging hazardous conditions and 
accident pathogens in real-time and over different 
time-scales;
2.  the monitoring / reliable estimation of the conditions 
and status of all safety barriers that implement the 
defense-in-depth strategy (especially if they are 
degraded or breached);
3.  the support of sensemaking of the previously identified 
hazardous conditions and accident pathogens, and the 
understanding of potential accident sequences that 
might follow (how they can propagate).
Observability-in-depth is fundamentally an information-
centric principle, and its importance in accident prevention 
is in the value of the information it provides and actions 
or safety interventions it spurs, as we will discuss shortly. 
Observability-in-depth is intimately related to and supports 
situational awareness at the operational and organizational 
levels, and it allows us to conceive of a dynamic defense-in-
depth safety strategy in which some defensive resources, 
safety barriers and others, are prioritized and re-allocated 
dynamically in response to emerging risks [9,14]. More 
details will follow in the next sections. It is worth clarifying 
that observability-in-depth, just like defense-in-depth, can 
be implemented in a variety of ways and it requires ingenuity—
technical, operational, and organizational—to conceive 
and implement in different contexts and for dealing with 
different types of hazards, accident pathogens, and safety 
barriers.
Except in the nuclear industry where its use is more 
mature and dynamic than in other industries, Probabilistic 
Risk (or Safety) Assessment (PRA or PSA, here used in-
terchangeably) has traditionally been performed offline 
and used as a static tool to help identify and prioritize 
various risks before system operation. The nuclear industry 
has two concepts that go beyond the traditional static risk 
analysis; they are the “Living Probabilistic Safety Assess-
ment” or LPSA and the “risk monitors”. Living PSA is 
defined as a safety assessment that is updated on a regular 
basis, and the updates are done to account for “changes 
in the design and operation of the plant, improvements in 
how the plant behaves in fault conditions, and improve-
ments in PSA methods, models, and data” [15]. Although 
still an offline tool, LPSA offers an important method-
ological advance with respect to the traditional PSA in 
that its models and data are not static but exhibit some 
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Given this brief explanation of Observability in Control 
theory and our previous definition of the observability-
in-depth safety principle, the reader may have noticed 
that the two terms present some differences. Indeed while 
observability-in-depth adopts its first term from Control 
Theory, and it is inspired by the general quest of Observability 
– namely figuring out or estimating the internal states of a 
system for (better) decision-making purposes – the safety 
principle is significantly broader than its counterpart in 
Control Theory, and it is more constraining in terms of 
requirements for compliance. Three important extensions 
are worth making explicit:
1.  A system may be observable in a control theoretic 
sense, but if no provisions are taken to establish an 
“observer” of its states6, its observability is mean-
ingless since it is not acted upon, and as such it cannot 
support better decision-making. Observability-in-
depth specifically requires among other things an 
active scanning for potential hazardous conditions 
and accident pathogens in a system, and that the 
states of all safety barriers be observed (whether 
directly or through estimation); 
2.  Another important extension is in relation to acci-
dent pathogens: accident pathogens can be thought 
of as adverse latent conditions or failures, which 
compounded with other factors can further advance 
an accident sequence, precipitate an accident, or 
aggravate its consequences. An accident pathogen 
is thus a distinctive causal factor in an accident se-
quence, and it is inactive or lurking until triggered 
by other factors. Accident pathogens by definition 
have no visible effect on the system’s output under 
nominal operating conditions, and as such they are 
not observable in a control theoretic sense. Yet these 
are specifically what observability-in-depth is meant 
to scan for and identify (among other things). Since 
state estimation (observability in a control theoretic 
sense) is not possible for these conditions, direct 
observation and monitoring is required for accident 
pathogens7.
3.  Finally, observability in a control-theoretic sense 
deals with system’s inputs and outputs to estimate 
the quasi-current state of the system8. It is thus quasi-
retrospective in nature. Observability-in-depth, on 
can be inferred from the system’s inputs and outputs5. 
More formally, a generic dynamical system given by Eq. (1)
is said to be observable if the knowledge of the set of 
inputs u(t) and the set of outputs y(t) – measured from 
some initial time t0 – are sufficient to obtain a unique 
estimation of the system’s state vector x(t) for all future 
instants following t0. Equation 1 indicates a functional 
relationship between the evolution of the internal states 
of the system and the system’s inputs and current states. 
In Control Theory, the term state vector has a precise formal 
definition and it constitutes the foundation for most analytical 
techniques in this field. Roughly speaking, the state vector 
of a system is the minimum set of variables that contain 
all the necessary information about the internal condition 
of a system at some time t0; and that knowledge, along 
with the input(s) to the system (e.g., operators’ inputs) is 
sufficient to determine the system’s outputs or behavior.
Observability in Control Theory, as noted previously, 
is the ability to infer or estimate the internal system state 
from the output of the system without having to measure 
or “observe” that state directly (the distinction between 
state vector, x(t) and system output y(t) is important; see 
[14] and the references therein for details). Why or when 
is this feature relevant? It is sometimes the case in complex 
systems that the direct measurement and knowledge of 
the entire state vector is not possible due to a variety 
of reasons such as the lack of sensors, sensor hardware 
limitations, or inefficient information distribution among 
various subsystems of the plant. For example, in the case of 
an aircraft or drone tracking a nominal path, the angle of 
attack and the sideslip angle of the vehicle as well as the 
rate of change of both angles are parts of the system state 
(vector), since both the longitudinal and lateral dynamics 
of the vehicle are related to these angles and their rates of 
change. However, the accurate measurement of the two 
angles and their rates of change is not always possible. 
Their measurement would require, for example, accurate 
knowledge of the local wind conditions at every instant 
of time, which are often not available [14]. Observability 
and techniques of state estimations allow us to infer the 
vehicle’s state without having to directly measure them. 
(1)
5  The terms observability and diagnosability are used in a related 
manner. While there are some differences between them (in their 
domain of applicability and the nature of the underlying mathe-
matical models they apply to, time-driven dynamical systems in 
the first case and discrete event systems in the other), these dif-
ferences are not relevant for our purposes, and we will occasion-
ally use these two terms interchangeably. Observability-in-depth 
remains the overarching category under which both observability 
and diagnosability will be subsumed.
6  An observer in Control Theory is typically an algorithmic feature 
put in place to perform the state estimation of a system.
7  Accident pathogens may be in the degraded states of the defense-
in-depth provisions, lessening their defensive potential. It is im-
portant to ensure that such pathogens are continuously scanned for 
and monitored so that operators and decision-makers do not rely 
on a misleading estimation of the efficiency of available defensive 
resources for accident prevention.
8  There is typically a time delay (even if it is very short) associated 
with and required for performing the state estimation.
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To better illustrate the importance of the notion of 
observability of hazardous states, consider the following 
illustrative example10. A system departs from nominal 
operating conditions and begins drifting toward an in-
creasingly hazardous state as shown in Figure 1. Various 
safety barriers can be interposed between the nominal 
operating conditions (states) and the accident release (for 
some specifics about this point, in ref. [11] for example, 
the system is a splitting tower at an oil refinery, which 
is filling up with hydrocarbon. The barriers are safety 
pressure valves and specific design features designed to 
contain any overflow before the accident, namely loss 
of containment, occurs). We represent the accident tra-
jectory by plotting the evolution over time of the hazard 
level of the system, here considered loosely speaking as 
the closeness of the accident to being released. Assume 
that safety barriers are implemented to prevent the sys-
tem from reaching hazard level H0 in Figure 1, and that 
additional barriers are in place to block further escalation 
past H1 and H2 should the previous barriers fail or prove 
inadequate.
The solid line in Figure 1 represents the actual hazard 
level of the current state of the system, hereafter noted as 
H(t), while the dashed line represents the operators’ assumed 
hazard level, Ĥ(t), estimated from available information 
or through direct sensor observation. 
The gap between these two quantities, the actual and 
the estimated hazard levels can be noted as:
the other hand, requires additional information 
(e.g., triggering thresholds of accidents on certain 
state variables), and it includes an important aspect 
of predicting the propagation of current states to 
assess potential accident sequences that might follow 
(sensemaking). In this sense, observability-in-depth 
has a significant prospective dimension.
In short, it is proper to acknowledge that observability-
in-depth borrows the concept of observability from Control 
Theory with its emphasis on the knowledge of the internal 
states of a system toward an improved decision-making 
and control (in our case, accident prevention). However, 
beyond this general similarity, the two terms are different in 
their scope and implications: the safety principle is significantly 
broader than its counterpart in Control Theory; it is also 
more constraining in terms of requirements for compliance; and 
it is meant to address specific unsafe conditions (states) 
that are beyond the “field of view” of observability in a 
control theoretic sense9. 
The ability to observe or diagnose the transition of a 
system to a hazardous state or the occurrence of a safety-
degrading event is critical for the continued safety of 
operations. Roughly speaking, operators make decisions 
during system operation, which are both based on and 
affect the internal conditions/states of the system [16]. If the 
internal system states are not reliably observed or estimated 
(and reported), there is a distinct possibility that operators 
will make flawed decisions, which in turn can compromise 
the safe operation of the system or fail to check the escalation 
of an accident sequence (e.g., no decision when an intervention 
is warranted). 
(2)
Fig. 1. Schematic Representation of System Diagnosability/Observability, Adapted from [11]
9  The used word “observed” hereafter is not meant to be understood in 
its restricted control theoretic sense but its broader sense of directly 
observed, monitored, or reliably estimated.
10  This is based on ref. [11] by the authors and it is included here for 
convenience and illustrative purposes.
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the reactor lid during an inspection targeted for reactor 
pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration (VHP) nozzle 
cracking due to primary water stress corrosion [20]. The 
discovery of the cavity was in a sense fortuitous: 
 “During these inspections, the licensee discovered 
cracks in several VHP nozzles. Subsequent to the 
machining process to repair VHP Nozzle 3, the noz-
zle was observed to displace, or tip in the downhill direc-
tion as the machining apparatus was withdrawn. The 
displacement led DBNPS personnel to examine the 
region adjacent to VHP Nozzle 3” [20].
The cavity “extended completely through the 6.63 inch 
thick carbon steel reactor pressure vessel head down to a 
thin internal liner of stainless steel cladding” [20]. The 
degradation and breach of the reactor lid developed over 
an extended period of time unbeknown to the operators and 
plant managers. It was due to corrosion from a leak of boric 
acid. This lack of observability of the state or degradation 
of the reactor pressure vessel head barrier could have resulted 
in a massive loss of coolant with potential meltdown of 
the reactor [20]. This was a serious near miss, and the only 
element that prevented an accident from occurring was 
the internal cladding, which withstood the primary system 
pressure over the cavity during system operation and was 
neither designed for nor qualified to perform such function 
[20]. 
There are a number of lessons to be learned from 
this near miss at the Davis-Besse power plant, and many 
recommendations were provided in the NRC report [20], 
including for example heightened regulatory oversight 
of the plant. In addition to the specific recommendations 
provided, we propose that this and many other similar 
near misses support a more general recommendation, 
namely the adoption of the observability-in-depth safety 
principle, which was violated in this case, and whose 
implementation could have identified the degradation of 
this RPV safety barrier in a more timely manner.
Observability-in-depth can be implemented in many 
ways, and it requires creativity and technical ingenuity 
to design and implement in a variety of contexts and for 
monitoring different types of hazards and states of safety 
barriers. Regulations cannot be prescriptive in this regard, but 
a safety case can be required from the designers/operators 
to demonstrate compliance with this principle.
The “depth” qualifier in observability-in-depth serves 
two purposes, and it has both a temporal and causal di-
mension, as explained next.
First “depth” is used to distinguish the safety principle 
from the control theoretic concept of observability, and 
without which some confusion might arise as to the use 
and meaning of the term, especially among readers who 
are Control-literate (see earlier discussion on the simi-
larities and differences between these two terms). Second 
“depth” in observability is meant to provide a parallel to 
“depth” in defense-in-depth in the following sense: whatever 
This gap can result for example from the absence of 
observability into hazardous conditions in the system 
(e.g., missing sensors), or degraded observability (e.g., 
miscalibrated sensors or covered gauges), which can 
mislead the operators about the actual state of the system. 
Examples of these situations will be examined shortly.
In a previous work [11], we argued that all safety-de-
grading events or hazardous states that defense-in-depth 
is meant to protect against be diagnosable, that is, the 
failure or breach of any element in the implementation 
of defense-in-depth be observable—directly monitored 
or reliably estimated. This constitutes one aspect of the 
observability-in-depth safety principle. This principle 
implies among other things, and as a first step, that safety-
critical elements in a system be properly instrumented to 
reflect their actual state, the extent of their degradation if 
any, and their breach if or when that occurs. Many examples 
of accidents occurred, or were not prevented in a timely 
manner, because of a lack of implementation of this principle. 
We will examine such cases in Section 3.
In light of Figure 1, the purpose of observability-in-
depth is (i) to minimize the gap between the actual and 
the estimated hazard levels (ΔH), and (ii) to ensure that at 
the hazards levels associated with various safety barriers, H0, 
H1, and H2 in the figure, the two curves coincide if these 
hazard levels are reached (e.g., ΔH = 0 if H0 is reached—
the safety barriers designed to prevent the system from 
reaching H0 is breached). The end-objective is to provide 
sufficient time for the operators and decision-makers to 
understand an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene 
in a timely manner to abate it. By contrast, a persistent 
gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels, as 
shown in Figure 1, leaves the operators and decision-makers 
blind to the developing hazardous situation, and it shrinks 
the time window, and options, available to intervene.
A gap between the actual and the estimated hazard re-
flects degraded situational awareness. In [11], we noted that
 the concept of situation awareness involves an operator’s 
comprehension of a dynamic situation that he/she is 
monitoring or controlling [17; 18]. It is an important 
construct in cognitive engineering and is meant to capture, 
among other things, the operator’s “understanding of the 
state of the environment, including relevant parameters 
of the system” [19].
As such, observability-in-depth is intimately related to 
situational awareness, and it supports one important subset 
of the latter, namely the awareness of the occurrence of 
hazardous states in the system, and the understanding of 
the potential accident sequences that might follow. 
Consider the following example, which highlights 
one potentially catastrophic consequence of the lack of 
observability-in-depth with respect to a particular safety 
element in a nuclear power plant. The incident occurred 
at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. In March 2002 
a cavity of about 20-30 square inches was discovered in 
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a set of safety barriers and various hazardous states. Each 
hazardous transition/escalation in an accident sequence 
has a set of underlying causes, and Figure 2 includes the 
underlying causes of a transition from Si to Sj in the form 
of a Fault Tree.
The condition Pi in the fault tree is a latent failure or 
accident pathogen [21]; it does not have a visible effect 
on the system behaviour or operation, until the second 
condition in its AND gate occurs. If the system reaches 
state Si, the hazardous transition to Sj will occur, thus further 
advancing the accident sequence. The ability to observe 
such latent causal factors or accident pathogens in an accident 
sequence before they have a visible effect on the system 
operation is another aspect of the depthness of observability. 
In other words, the “further down” a fault tree are adverse 
conditions identified, the more depth there is to the ob-
servability-in-depth principle.
3.  EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES 
WHEN OBSERVABILITY-IN-DEPTH IS COMPRO-
MISED OR NOT IMPLEMENTED
In this section we provide a few examples that illustrate 
some of the adverse consequences that can follow from 
the lack of, or degraded, observability into hazardous 
conditions. The purpose is to show both the importance 
“level” of depth safety barriers are placed at (in a potential 
accident sequence), observability-in-depth is meant to 
chaperone each safety barrier to monitor its condition 
and status.
As noted previously, observability-in-depth charac-
terizes the ability to identify adverse states and conditions 
far upstream (early) in an accident sequence. It also re-
flects the ability to observe emerging accident pathogens 
and latent failures before their effect becomes manifest 
on the system’s output, or before an increasingly hazardous 
transition occurs in an accident sequence. “Depth”, as a 
result, has both a temporal and a causal dimension. 
To appreciate its temporal dimension, consider Figure 
1 and assume that an initiating event triggers an accident 
sequence. During the accident sequence, the time of oc-
currence of the accident is unknown and preferably right-
censored (i.e., it will be averted). We noted this time in 
Figure 1 as tA+. Looking back form the vantage point of the 
time of occurrence of the accident (tA+ as the origin of the new 
clock), the further away we can identify hazardous states or 
transitions, the more depth we have in the implementation of 
our safety principle. In other words, the temporal dimension 
of observability-in-depth is reflected in the δt shown in 
Figure 1, with δt0 reflecting more depth of observability 
than δt1.
To appreciate the causal dimension of “depth” in ob-
servability-in-depth, consider Figure 2, which represents 
Fig. 2. Schematic Illustration of an Accident Sequence, Defense-in-depth, and the Causal Dimension of “Depth” in Observability-in-depth
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from one particular perspective, namely that of observa-
bility-in-depth, and to highlight how deficiencies in the 
implementation of this principle contributed to the acci-
dent sequence or failed to prevent its escalation. Some 
brief technical knowledge is required for our discussion. 
A schematic representation of the reactor core with the 
cooling system circuits is shown in Figure 3.
The heat generated by the reactor core at the TMI 
plant was removed by a heat exchanger at the intersection 
of two cooling circuits: a primary internal circuit directly 
connected to the reactor core, and a secondary external 
circuit connected to steam turbines (see Figure 3). Main 
pumps as well as emergency backups and pressure relief 
valves existed for both the internal and external circuits. 
Steam downstream of the heat exchanger drove the turbines 
(the power generation elements). This particular design, as 
well as the main pumps and emergency backups, and the 
pressure relief valves are specific elements in the imple-
mentation of defense-in-depth. And while they were par-
ticularly important for the safe operation of the plant, the 
fact that observability-in-depth was lacking or compromised 
in their design, as we will discuss shortly, rendered this a 
defense-blind strategy. Moreover, the inability to observe 
and assess the states of some of these safety barriers not 
only failed to prevent the escalation of the accident sequence, 
but also directly contributed to its advancement. In short, 
we argue that the Three Mile Island accident was to a large 
extent the result of a violation of the observability-in-depth 
safety principle, and while its proper implementation would 
of observability-in-depth by examining cases when it is not 
implemented, and by the same token to highlight the set of 
problems that it can help address or prevent. We begin with 
the well-known Three Mile Island accident and examine it 
from this perspective of observability-in-depth (or deficiencies 
in). Then we discuss several “event reports” from the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission database, which reflect 
potential concealment of accident pathogens in the lines 
of defense.
3.1  The Archetype Case Study: the Three Mile Island 
Accident
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident of March 1979 
is perhaps the most famous incidents in the history of 
nuclear power plants in the United States. A complex 
sequence of events led to the loss of the water-coolant, 
which resulted in a partial core meltdown [10] and caused 
over $2 billion in damages [22]. 
The chain of causality leading to the accident has 
been widely discussed, see for example [10, 23, 24], and 
the accident became the subject of numerous debates for 
the complexity of the sequence of events starting from 
a leaky valve and emergency pump shutdown and leading 
to the reactor partial meltdown. The accident resulted 
from a combination of factors, including four separate 
malfunctions in the internal and external cooling circuits, 
overall sloppy maintenance and organizational deficien-
cies11 [10, 23], and operators’ errors. Our purpose here 
is not to revisit the accident sequence, but to examine it 
Fig. 3. Simplified Schematic of the Reactor Core and the Cooling Circuits, Adapted from [26]
11  Gorinson et al. [25] and Hopkins [10] highlight how events similar to those indicated in Figure 4 had occurred in an incident 18 months earlier 
at the Davis-Besse reactor. Also previous failures of the relief valves had been witnessed in reactors manufactured by the same firm of the TMI 
plant. These and other near misses and warning signs apparently went unnoticed by the management of the TMI nuclear reactor. 
FAVARÒ et al.,  Observability-in-Depth: An Essential Complement to the Defense-in-Depth Safety Strategy in the Nuclear Industry
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.46  NO.6  DECEMBER 2014 811
manner before core meltdown.
The accident sequence mainly concerned the primary 
and secondary cooling circuits of the reactor core. A sim-
plified overview of the events that led to the reactor core 
partial meltdown in shown in Figure 4. 
not have prevented the initiating events from occurring—some 
of the factors noted previously were directly responsible 
for this, namely technical failures, sloppy maintenance, 
and organizational deficiencies—it would have ensured 
that the accident sequence was terminated in a timely 
Fig. 4. Simplified Accident Sequence
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Different authors have debated at length the contro-
versial issue of “operator error” in the early termination 
of the high-pressure injection pumps [10, 23]. Hopkins 
points out that, “had the pumps been allowed to continue 
operating, the accident could have been avoided” [10]. 
The “design flaws” of the relief valve and its monitoring 
system caused the control room to receive an incorrect 
signal of its position. The operators then acted on this in-
correct understanding of the plant condition. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no explanation in the literature 
as to why this condition unfolded. 
The impossibility to monitor and diagnose an ongoing 
LOCA from the relief valve status is not the only viola-
tion of observability-in-depth. For instance, there was no 
instrument that allowed the operator to understand how 
much water covered the reactor core [26]. The time history 
of the water level could have improved the situational 
awareness of the operators and their understanding of the 
actual hazard level reached by the reactor. 
Perrow choose this accident as the archetype of his 
“normal accident theory”, where an accident “is termed 
normal because it is inherent in the characteristics of 
tightly coupled, complex systems and cannot be avoided” 
[23]. The normal accident argument, and specifically 
its applicability to the TMI accident, was criticized by 
Hopkins [10]. In his work, Hopkins provides a careful 
analysis of Perrow’s point of view and notes that “Per-
row claim[ed] that the information available to the opera-
tors [was] so flawed that there was no way they could 
have been expected to understand what was going on and 
react in an effective manner” [10]. Perrow’s conclusion 
based on this observation is that the accident was indeed 
a “normal” occurrence, in the sense that its incompre-
hensible nature made prevention impossible. We agree 
that the flawed and missing information about the status 
of critical safety elements at TMI degraded the operators’ 
situational awareness and hampered their ability to safely 
operate the plant. However instead of conceiving and ac-
cepting this and similar accidents as “normal”, we trace 
back one important element in their causal chain, namely 
the lack of observability of emerging hazardous states, 
and we conceive of a safety principle, observability-in-
depth, whose implementation can help prevent similar 
occurrences.
3.2  Observability-in-depth and the NRC Database of 
Licensee Event Reports
In this subsection we discuss several event reports 
from the NRC’s Licensee Event Reports (LER) database, 
which illustrate more situations that can results from the 
lack of, or degraded, observability into hazardous conditions. 
By the same token, theses examples highlight an additional 
set of problems that fall within the scope of observability-
in-depth and which this safety principle can help address 
or prevent.
Caveat: It is important to note that this subsection 
The accident sequence was triggered by a leak in the 
external cooling circuit, which caused the main pumps to 
shut down [10]. Two days prior to this event, the emer-
gency pumps of the external circuit had been shut down 
for maintenance work and were still inoperable. This con-
dition, apparently unknown to the operators at the time of 
the accident (first unobserved latent adverse condition), 
led to the impossibility to dissipate the heat from the in-
ternal circuit. As a result, the reactor core began to overheat, 
leading to its preventive shutdown. However, the pressure 
in the internal circuit kept increasing due to “decay heat” 
from the reactor core [10]. At this point, the emergency re-
lief valve of the internal circuit opened, letting the coolant 
escape and lowering the pressure to the nominal value. 
The relief valve should have closed when the pressure 
fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments 
in the control room however indicated that the valve was 
closed [26]. The decrease in pressure activated the emergency 
high-pressure injection pumps in the internal circuit to 
prevent the core meltdown [10]. After noticing the pressure 
rise in the internal circuit, the operators were unaware of 
the loss of coolant from the internal circuit. This is the 
second major unobserved condition in this accident sequence, 
and it was due not only to the flawed sensor that was 
monitoring the status of the relief valve, but also to the 
absence of provisions to directly monitor and estimate the 
coolant flow in the primary internal circuit12. We conceive 
of this situation as a gross violation of the observability-in-
depth safety principle—two major elements in the imple-
mentation of defense-in-depth were not properly monitored 
and their status not directly observable.
The operators, still unaware of the loss of coolant from 
the internal circuit, manually throttled down the emergency 
pumps. This was considered in hindsight as a significant 
operator error and it led directly to the accident—the reactor’s 
(partial) core meltdown. However, as shown here, this 
decision was the result of flawed or missing information 
that degraded the operators situational awareness and 
failed to convey the hazardous conditions of various 
safety barriers. It took them about 2 hours and 20 minutes 
to understand that a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 
was ongoing. The total meltdown was then prevented by 
flooding the reactor core with cold water. While this extreme 
measure prevented the release of radioactive material, 
major irreversible damage had already been done [10]. 
12  We thank a reviewer for providing the following clarification, that for 
the TMI power plant, indicators of the auxiliary the feedwater block 
valves position existed. However, tags covered those indicators – 
an inadvertent outcome of bad practice. The impossibility for the 
operators to observe the correct position of the valves, whether 
stemming from design flaws, bad practice, or other mechanisms, 
constitutes a violation of the OID principle. These mechanisms 
contribute to the incorrect estimation of the plant condition, hence 
deteriorating the operator situational awareness.
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threat to the safety of the plant, it constituted a latent 
failure or adverse pre-existing condition, which 
when compounded with other factors, could have 
further advanced an accident sequence, for example 
if the emergency generators were called upon. As such, 
this condition constitutes a non-negligible accident 
pathogen [21]. The fact that it was not observable 
or its observability compromised is an instance of 
failed implementation of the observability-in-depth 
principle (specifically in this case a redundant safety 
barrier was inoperable and its breach was not monitored 
or reliably observable).
●  CASE II – Unmonitored Flowpath in Safety Injection 
Cooling Pumps [31]: In this case a review of the 
pump testing surveillances showed that unmoni-
tored flowpaths existed for different pumps, including 
the safety injection pump of the cooling system at 
the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. According 
to the report, the regulations current at the time of 
the system design, did not “explicitly require” [31] 
to monitor the total pump flow. The unmonitored 
flowpaths diverted flow from the pump discharge prior 
to the point at which the flow measurement was taken, 
hence resulting in a condition of compromised ob-
servability of the pump flow. 
     At the time of the instrumentation design, the 
potential impact of unmonitored flowpaths on the 
ability to test in order to detect pump degradation 
was not fully realized [31]. Indeed, unmonitored 
flowpaths have the potential to mask the detection 
of pump degradation by altering the expected meas-
urements of flow and differential pressure. As with 
the previous case, this condition compromises the 
observability of the state of the pump, thus allowing 
an accident pathogen to emerge and go unnoticed. 
●  CASE III – Design Deficiency - Potential for an 
Unmonitored Release Path [32]: In this case an 
unmonitored release path of contaminated air was 
identified during an engineering evaluation of the 
station service water system circuit. The identified 
condition would allow “contaminated air to enter 
the service water piping [...] and to subsequently 
be released to the outside environment” in case of 
a Loss of Power/Loss of Coolant Accident event, 
thus resulting in a loss of secondary containment 
[32].
    The failure to identify this release path was considered 
in the report as non-compliance with General Design 
Criteria. Moreover, it shows the inability to observe 
a potential accident sequence. In other words, in 
case of loss of secondary containment through this 
particular path, the operators would not be able to 
identify the release of the contaminated air to the 
outside environment. Observability-in-depth was in 
this case violated by this particular release path.
does not constitute nor should it be considered a basis for 
statistical analysis of the problem of lack of observability of 
adverse conditions in the LER database—although this 
would be an interesting topic and a fruitful venue for fu-
ture research. This subsection is merely for illustrative 
purposes and to better delineate the scope and extent of 
observability-in-depth.
The NRC has required nuclear power plants to submit 
LER since 1980, and more than 51,00013 of these reports 
have since been submitted. Commercial nuclear reactor 
licensees are required to report certain event information 
when adverse conditions occur in a nuclear power plant, 
which are beyond its technical specifications [27, 28]. For 
example, the malfunction of a required safety barrier or 
the discovery of a potential design flaw would trigger the 
need for an LER. Once an LER is submitted, NRC staff 
review it to understand and confirm the licensee’s assess-
ment of the situation. NRC staff experts also determine 
whether the licensee’s resolution of the issue continues to 
maintain adequate levels of safety and protection of the 
public [29]. The NRC provides public online access to 
the LER database. Each report consists of an abstract, a 
description of the events sequence, the event significance 
and implications, the identified causes, the implemented 
corrective actions, and additional information (e.g. infor-
mation on similar previous occurrences). 
Compared with the case study approach in Subsection 
3.1, event reports (LER) allow the discussion of a broader 
set of situations, as the events reported are usually less 
serious in terms of their consequences and their occurrence 
relatively straightforward (or not as involved as in the 
TMI accident).
●  CASE I – Inoperable emergency diesel generator 
due to low fuel oil in storage tank [30]: this case 
resulted from incorrect readings of the level of fuel 
oil contained in the storage tank of an emergency 
diesel generator. A low level of fuel oil (below the 
required minimum) was discovered during an in-
spection and investigation revealed that incorrect 
readings had been going on for more than a month. 
According to the report “the primary cause was a 
challenging method for determining tank level” 
[30]. The level indicator reading was also susceptible 
to exogenous disturbances, becoming “more unreliable 
under adverse conditions (e.g., poor weather, low 
light conditions)” [30]. Contributing factors included 
also a malfunctioning tank level indicator and the 
corresponding alarm. The investigation highlighted 
the “inadequate instrument design” of the fuel oil 
tank level alarm and the indicator.
    While this situation did not pose a considerable 
13  Query executed on 12/10/2013. 
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3.  the sensemaking of the emerging hazardous conditions 
and the understanding of potential accident sequences 
that might follow (and how they can propagate).
In this sense, observability-in-depth should be thought of 
as a complement to the well-established defense-in-depth 
safety strategy, without which the latter can devolve into 
a defense-blind safety strategy. Observability-in-depth is 
thus fundamentally an information-centric principle, and 
its importance in accident prevention is in the value of the 
information it provides and actions or safety interventions 
it spurs.
One objective of observability-in-depth is to minimize 
the gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels 
in a system in real-time, and in so doing to provide sufficient 
time for the operators and decision-makers to understand 
an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene in a timely 
manner to abate it. As such, we proposed that observability-
in-depth is intimately related to situational awareness, and 
it supports one important aspect of the latter, namely the 
awareness of the occurrence of hazardous states in the 
system in real time, and the understanding of the potential 
accident sequences that might follow (sensemaking of the 
emerging hazardous conditions). The hazardous states can 
be technical, operational, or organizational. We explained 
that the depth qualifier in our principle has both a causal 
and a temporal dimension, and it is meant to characterize the 
ability to identify adverse states and conditions far upstream 
in an accident sequence.
Changing mind-sets: Probability Risk Assessment 
(PRA) has traditionally been performed offline and used 
as a static tool to help identify and prioritize various risks 
before system operation (see caveat in the Introduction 
about the status of PRA in the nuclear industry). Similarly, 
defense-in-depth has to some extent an implicit static 
connotation. Observability-in-depth introduces a real-time 
mind-set into risk analysis and management, and it supports 
the development of an online probabilistic risk assessment, 
which in turn can help dynamically re-order risk priorities 
based on emerging hazards, and re-allocate some defensive 
resources accordingly. As such, observability-in-depth can 
help conceive of a dynamic defense-in-depth safety 
strategy in which some defensive resources, safety barriers 
and others, are prioritized and allocated dynamically in 
response to emerging risks.
●  CASE IV – Unmonitored Release Path Due to Ra-
dioactive Ash [33]: In this case an unmonitored re-
lease path of contaminated ash was identified during 
the preparations to put a heating boiler into service 
for the winter season. The event report established 
that “if the ash on the fire side of the boiler contains 
radioactive constituents, some of the particulate matter 
could be discharged through the boiler exhaust” [33].
    This event may appear less severe and unremarkable 
compared with the previous ones. But the interesting 
point here is that the ashes in the boiler resulted 
from an original contamination and leak that occurred 
25 years before the discovery of the unmonitored 
release path. This constitutes an interesting example 
not only of the unobserved accident pathogen, but 
also of the lack of a defense barrier against the release 
of the contaminated ashes. 
These cases only represent the tip of the iceberg of 
instances of adverse conditions that can be gleaned from 
the LER database, and which can be considered in some 
ways instances of violation of observability-in-depth. 
Further examination of this database for events that include 
unobserved adverse conditions and breaches of safety barriers 
would be a fruitful venue for future research.
4. CONCLUSION
To prevent the hazard-concealing potential of defense-
in-depth from materializing, and more generally to introduce 
a real-time mind-set into risk analysis and management, we 
proposed in this work a safety principle termed observability-
in-depth, which helps focus attention on these issues. We 
defined it as:
1.  the set of provisions, technical, operational, and or-
ganizational designed to enable the monitoring and 
identification of emerging hazardous conditions and 
accident pathogens in real-time and over different 
time-scales;
2.  the monitoring / reliable estimation of the conditions 
and status of all safety barriers that implement the 
defense-in-depth strategy (especially if they are 
degraded or breached);
Table 1. Selected LER – search Keywords and Scenarios Summary
Case ID and Event Report # Keyword Highlighted Scenario
I - 3521996022 Malfunctioning Indicator Compromised/degraded observation
II - 4231998027 Unmonitored Compromised observation
III - 3541997025 Unmonitored Unobserved
IV - 2451997037 Unmonitored Unobserved
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Observability-in-depth extends beyond specific tech-
niques, alarms, and instrumentations, and it provides a 
broad strategic heading under which tools and techniques 
such as living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA), 
risk monitors, and prognostic and health management 
can be subsumed.
This work constitutes a first step in the development of 
the observability-in-depth safety principle, and we hope this 
effort invites other researchers and safety professionals 
to further explore and build on this principle. We believe 
some fruitful venues for further research include examining:
i.   the implementation of observability-in-depth in 
specific contexts and at multiple scales, at the 
technical and operational plant levels, and at the 
industry level (different time scales will also have 
to be accounted for);
ii.   the extent to which observability-in-depth is re-
quired in specific contexts, and what changes (ad-
ditions, deletions, modifications, etc.) would be 
required to achieve appropriate levels;
iii.  the integration of observability-in-depth and its 
outputs into existing (living) probabilistic safety 
assessments;
iv.   the policy implications of observability-in-depth, 
and the planning of a test case or pilot project for 
its implementation;
v.   (on a more theoretical level) the relationship / in-
terplay between the three constructs: observability-
in-depth, situational awareness, and sensemaking.
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